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Shortly after the startling collapse of Communist regimes across Eastern Europe in 1989, 
the field of contemporary China studies was swept by a “democratization” paradigm that looked 
for imminent regime transition in the People’s Republic of China [PRC] as well.
1  Scholars 
pointed to the growth of NGOs and other signs of bottom-up activism in post-Tiananmen China 
as evidence of a rising civil society poised to challenge the Chinese Communist Party’s [CCP] 
monopoly on power.
2  A quarter of a century later, however, sobered by the failure of the PRC to 
undergo significant political reform despite sustained economic progress, the China field is today 
more inclined toward an “authoritarian resilience” paradigm that presumes the indefinite survival 
of the Communist party-state system.
3  This analytical shift, while at some risk of underplaying 
the very serious problems which plague the Chinese system and render all political predictions 
                                                           
1 In preparing this paper, I benefited greatly from the expert research guidance of Nancy Hearst, Fairbank Center 
Librarian at Harvard University, who obtained many of the primary sources.  Harvard undergraduate Rachel Wong 
was an able research assistant.  The editors of this volume, Tia Thornton and Vivienne Shue, also provided valuable 
suggestions for revision.   
2 See, for example, He Baogang, The Democratization of China (New York: Routledge, 1996); and Bruce Gilley, 
China’s Democratic Future: How it Will Happen and Where it Will Lead (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004). 
3 See, for example, Teresa Wright, Accepting Authoritarianism: State-Society Relations in China’s Reform Era 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010); and James Reilly, Strong Society Smart State: The Rise of Public Opinion 
in China (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012). 2 
 
perilous, nevertheless serves the salutary purpose of focusing attention on the actual mechanisms 
of state rule that have sustained the polity to date. 
In reassessing the staying power of the Chinese state, analysts have emphasized such 
critical indicators as the system’s ability to recruit, monitor, and hold accountable government 
officials; to grow and guide the economy via flexible policy levers; to invest in valued public 
goods; to enlist the active support of entrepreneurs and other key social groups; and to keep the 
lid on popular protest through a clever combination of coercion, censorship, cooptation, and 
conciliation.
4  There is however a more elusive, yet no less critical, element of state capacity: the 
facility of the Party-state to make a case for its “right to rule” in terms that resonate both at home 
and abroad.  For this task, the PRC leans heavily upon cultural governance, or the deployment of 
symbolic resources as an instrument of political authority. It does so, moreover, in a manner that 
underscores the distinctively “Chinese” character of the political system.  A state whose ideology 
and institutions were imported almost wholesale from the Soviet Union is represented in party 
propaganda as part and parcel of a glorious “Chinese tradition.”  Over the years, the Chinese 
Communist Party has continually “re-Oriented” its message so as to come across as culturally 
congruent with its principal target audience.  The process bespeaks a dynamic and diversified 
propaganda operation that is as attentive to popular emotions as to party ideology.   
Cultural Governance 
                                                           
4 Lily L. Tsai, Accountability Without Democracy: Solidary Groups and Public Goods Provision in Rural China (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Kellee S. Tsai, Capitalism Without Democracy: The Private Sector in 
Contemporary China (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007); Barry J. Naughton and Dali L. Yang, eds., Holding 
China Together (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Sebastian Heilmann and Elizabeth J. Perry, eds., 
Mao’s Invisible Hand: The Foundations of Adaptive Governance in China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2011); Xi Chen, Social Protest and Contentious Authoritarianism in China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2012). 3 
 
Cultural governance figures in the legitimation and perpetuation of any enduring state 
system.
5  When practiced by critics of the system (whether from inside or outside the state 
apparatus), cultural governance may serve to question – or even to resist – state power.
6  
Controlling and channeling symbolic political expression so that it strengthens rather than 
challenges government legitimacy is therefore a concern for all states, but perhaps especially so 
for those which lack robust and respected electoral and legal institutions capable of conferring 
procedural legitimacy on state leaders.
7  In the absence of firmly established democratic 
institutions, leaders may find historical and cultural assertions to be of indispensable value in 
staking their claim to a “right to rule.”   
It has sometimes been suggested that reliance on cultural modes of governance was 
particularly pronounced in “traditional” polities where the lines between secular and religious 
power were indistinct and overlapping.
8  Clifford Geertz’s analysis of nineteenth-century Bali, 
for example, depicted a “theatre state” ruled by rituals and symbols rather than by force.
9  
Imperial China, which administered a far-flung empire with a remarkably small cadre of 
bureaucratic officials, is often cited as another archetypal case of effective cultural governance.  
There the shared literary and moral universe of intellectuals and officials, imparted through a 
classical Confucian education, institutionalized in government-sponsored examinations, and 
                                                           
5 Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Chicago and Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964); Michael J. 
Shapiro, Methods and Nations: Cultural Governance and the Indigenous Subject (New York: Routledge, 2004). 
6 William A. Callahan, Cultural Governance and Resistance in Pacific Asia (New York: Routledge, 2006). 
7 Lisa Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric and Symbols in Contemporary Syria (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1999). 
8 Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1965). 
9 Clifford C. Geertz, Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth Century Bali (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1981). 4 
 
observed in family, community and state rituals, helped to uphold and invigorate a dynastic order 
for centuries.
10  
By demarcating the boundaries of the realm (tianxia) along cultural rather than territorial 
lines, Confucian political theory assigned great weight to the proper performance of symbolic 
rituals as a means of producing and promoting obedience and allegiance.  In Joseph Levenson’s 
influential formulation, Chinese “culturalism” (which he contrasted to modern “nationalism”) 
underpinned a powerful identity that elevated Confucian mandarins and their subjects above the 
unwashed “barbarians” outside the Sinic world.
11  The impact of these cultural claims was felt 
externally as well as internally.  Vivienne Shue observes that “if not by conquest, then by 
cultural splendor and the projection of a confident superiority itself, the empire could manage to 
command the respect of those powers on its periphery and beyond.”
12 
The Revolution of 1911 dealt a deathblow to the imperial political system and its cultural 
foundations.  Twentieth-century revolutionaries and statesmen, chafing under the humiliation of 
Western imperialism, sought to save China by importing foreign ideologies of nationalism and 
Communism to supplant the seemingly exhausted Confucian culturalism.  “China’s cultural 
superiority,” Shue notes, “became harder and harder simply to assume, and her national glory 
came to be measured not in its radiant splendor, but in painful comparisons with other rising 
empires and competitor states.”
13  Modern political parties and regimes, whose power emanated 
from “the barrel of a gun” – as Mao Zedong put it baldly – rather than from the Mandate of 
                                                           
10 John King Fairbank, China: A New History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994); Angela Zito, Of Body and 
Brush: Grand Sacrifice as Text/Performance in Eighteenth-Century China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1997); Patricia M. Thornton, Disciplining the State: Virtue, Violence and State-making in Modern China (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2007). 
11 Joseph R. Levenson, Confucian China and Its Modern Fate: A Trilogy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1968). 
12 Vivienne Shue, “Legitimacy Crisis in China?” in Peter Hays Gries and Stanley Rosen, eds., Chinese Politics: State, 
Society and the Market (New York: Routledge, 2010): 49. 
13 Shue: 49. 5 
 
Heaven, introduced a new pattern of secular rule directed by militaristic cadres in place of 
moralistic literati.  The magnitude of the rupture was underscored by Levenson when he warned 
against the fallacy of interpreting Chinese Communism as simply warmed-over “Confucianism 
with another name and another skin but the same perennial spirit.  Canonical texts and canonical 
texts, bureaucratic intellectual elite and bureaucratic intellectual elite – nothing has changed, 
allegedly – except, possibly, everything.”
14  Levenson’s focus on the wrenching shift from 
culturalism to nationalism highlighted the profound transformation of modern China, which 
occurred through the succession of revolutions that toppled the imperial order and installed first a 
republican and then a communist political system.  In contrast to imperial dynasties, these 
revolutionary regimes would struggle to repair and reassert Chinese pride in a “modern” world 
order of competing nation-states.   
Despite such monumental ideological and institutional changes, however, the 
contemporary Chinese state also leans heavily on cultural governance.  While far from 
“traditional” in its espoused secularism and embrace of a “scientific development outlook,” the 
PRC continues to devote considerable attention and energy to the exercise of symbolic power as 
a means to affirm its right to rule. It does so, moreover, in ways which creatively blend 
“culturalist” and “nationalist” claims.  The Beijing Olympics, intended as a kind of “coming out 
party” for a rising China, provided a graphic illustration of the PRC’s professed identity as the 
rightful inheritor and steward of a five-thousand-year-old civilization.
15  From the eye-catching 
logo based on the ancient art of seal calligraphy to the breathtaking opening ceremony directed 
by cinematographer Zhang Yimou, the 2008 Olympic Games offered a spectacular display of the 
                                                           
14 Levenson, Confucian China, Book I: 162. 
15 Susan Brownell, Beijing’s Games: What the Olympics Mean to China (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Press, 
2008); Jennifer Hubbert, “Spectacular Productions: Community and Commodity in the Beijing Olympics,” City and 
Society, vol. 22, no. 1 (June 2010): 119-142; Jennifer Hubbert, “Of Menace and Mimicry: The 2008 Beijing 
Olympics,” Modern China, no. 39 (July 2013): 408-437. 6 
 
Communist Party’s declaration to be perpetuating and perfecting a seamless cultural tradition. 
Beijing’s effort to project Chinese soft power globally through the establishment of hundreds of 
government-sponsored “Confucius Institutes” around the world is further evidence of this 
impulse.
16 
China’s rulers today are quite explicit in the high value they put on cultural governance.  
They are almost equally explicit in their instrumental use of cultural governance for nationalistic 
ends.  In his address to the 18
th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 
November 2012, the retiring General-Secretary of the CCP, Hu Jintao, declared that “culture is 
the life blood of the nation.” Hu emphasized that “the strength and international competitiveness 
of Chinese culture is an important indicator of China’s power and prosperity and the revival of 
the Chinese nation.”  Hu Jintao called for promoting “traditional” Chinese culture and made 
multiple references to the “great revival of the Chinese nation” (Zhonghua minzu weida fuxing  
中华民族伟大复兴), a phrase repeated by incoming CCP General-Secretary Xi Jinping in his 
own remarks to the Party Congress.  Standing in front of a monumental painting of the Great 
Wall, Xi proudly referenced China’s 5,000 year old civilization, proclaiming that “the great 
revival of the Chinese nation is the greatest dream of the Chinese nation in modern history.”
17 
Immediately after the Congress, Xi led his newly elected fellow members of the Politburo 
Standing Committee on a well-publicized visit to the National Museum of China to view an 
exhibition entitled The Road to Revival which featured the heroic role of the Communist Party in 
spearheading China’s nationalist struggles.  Opening with China’s humiliation in the Opium 
Wars, the exhibit sounded a triumphal note with its declaration that “today the Chinese nation 
                                                           
16 In the U.S. alone, over 80 Confucius Institutes with enrollments of nearly 160,000 students were founded in the 
space of a mere eight years.   International Herald Leader (June 5, 2012).  On soft power in general, see Joseph S. 
Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004). 
17 “New Party Leadership Gains Limelight,” Xinhua (November 15, 2012); “Xi Jinping Pledges ‘Great Renewal of 
Chinese Nation’,” Global Times (November 30, 2012). 7 
 
towers majestically in the Orient; the brilliant prospect of the great revival is already unfolding 
before us.  The dream and quest of China’s sons and daughters can definitely be realized!”
18  
Employing a brand of extravagant rhetoric once reserved for praise of Chairman Mao, the CCP 
was re-Orienting its propaganda to showcase the glories of the ancient civilization that it claims 
to be representing and reviving. 
That this line of cultural-cum-nationalist propaganda enjoys considerable currency in the 
contemporary PRC had been demonstrated two years earlier when the Chinese Communist Party 
celebrated its 90
th anniversary with a blockbuster movie entitled Beginning of the Great Revival. 
Featuring a star-studded cast of Chinese and Overseas Chinese actors, the film conflated the birth 
of the Communist Party with the great revival of the Chinese nation and portrayed the young 
Mao Zedong as a central figure in that national renaissance.  Beginning of the Great Revival was 
the top-selling Chinese movie in the PRC in 2011, outranking even Harry Potter and Spiderman 
in ticket sales.
19   A New York Times review described the movie as “a proud statement by an 
ascendant society.”
20 
Cultural Nationalism 
The current prominence of cultural nationalism in PRC governance is often interpreted as 
a recent development, traceable to the suppression of the Tiananmen Uprising of 1989.  Yingjie 
Guo writes, “The surge of cultural nationalism in post-Tiananmen China can be explained in 
terms of . . .  the increasing importance given to state nationalism by a party-state which is eager 
to shore up its own position as the ruling party.  Having shifted away from its traditional 
                                                           
18 http://fuxing.chnmuseum.cn/intro.php  accessed April 18, 2013. 
19 Only Kungfu Panda 2 and Pirates of the Caribbean did better at PRC box offices that year. “Zhongguo neidi 
dianying piaofang lishi paihang” [Historic rankings of China’s domestic movie ticket sales], Mtime, accessed March 
10, 2013. http://group.mtime.com/12781/discussion/253526/. 
20 Andy Webster, “Chinese History, Straight from the Source,” New York Times (June 24, 2011). 8 
 
Marxist-Maoist basis of legitimization, the CCP is compelled to reposition itself . . .”
21   Faced 
with the discrediting of Marxism-Leninism in the post-Cold War era, so the argument goes, the 
Chinese state cast about for a new framework of legitimation, settling upon a formula intended to 
derive strength from popular pride in the glories of Chinese civilization (as well as the gains of 
the Communist revolution).  The shift, it is emphasized, was driven by external as well as 
internal pressures.  Zhao Suisheng explains, “The Western sanctions after the 1989 crackdown 
were interpreted in official propaganda as anti-China . . . The Communist regime repositioned 
itself as the representative of China’s national interest and the defender of Chinese national 
pride.”
22  The state-sponsored Patriotic Education Campaign, launched with much fanfare in the 
1990s, sought to inoculate the younger generation against the temptations of “bourgeois 
liberalism” by a dual focus on the cultural splendors of the Chinese past and the heroic sacrifices 
of the CCP in rebuilding the Chinese nation. Zhao continues, “By appealing to the students’ 
sense of patriotism rather than trying to convert them to Marxism, the Communist regime hoped 
to reassert its moral authority.”
23 
There is definite merit in this argument, as long as it does not obscure the importance of 
cultural governance with nationalist objectives as an instrument of mobilization and rule (played 
in different keys and at different decibel levels) throughout the ninety-plus-year history of 
Chinese Communism.  As Mao proclaimed during the war with Japan: 
Our national history goes back several thousand years and has its own 
characteristics and innumerable treasures . . . .  We should sum up our history 
from Confucius to Sun Yat-sen and take over this valuable legacy . . . . [W]e can 
put Marxism into practice only when it is integrated with the specific 
characteristics of our country and acquires a definite national form . . . . Foreign 
stereotypes must be abolished, there must be less singing of empty, abstract tunes, 
                                                           
21 Yingjie Guo, Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary China (New York: Routledge, 2004): 1-2. 
22 Suisheng Zhao, A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2004): 8. 
23 Zhao, 2004: 219. 9 
 
and dogmatism must be laid to rest; they must be replaced by the fresh, lively 
Chinese style and spirit which the common people of China love.
24 
 
The contemporary emphasis on cultural nationalism, rather than a sharp break with an earlier 
reliance on Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought as the ideological foundation of Chinese 
Communism, marks yet another turn in a tortuous legitimation project that has frequently (if 
fitfully) drawn upon a wide range of resonant symbols from the Chinese past and present – elite 
and folk culture alike – to buttress the standing of the CCP.  Today’s Patriotic Education 
Campaign is a recent expression of an impulse with deep roots in the experience of the Chinese 
Communist Party.   
Most of the early Communist leaders, Mao Zedong included, were educated intellectuals 
who brought to their mobilizing efforts substantial cultural capital and creativity.  Central to their 
revolutionary process was the role of what I have elsewhere called cultural positioning – or the 
strategic utilization of a diverse array of symbolic resources (from Mandarin gowns and literary 
aphorisms to popular religion and secret-society conventions) for purposes of political 
persuasion.  The supple methods of Mao and his fellow teachers-cum-revolutionaries not only 
enabled the transplantation of Marxist-Leninist ideas and institutions onto Chinese soil; they 
further ensured that the Chinese revolutionary variant would grow into something quite different 
from its Russian prototype.  After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, party and 
government agencies – led by the Department of Propaganda and the Ministry of Culture – 
spearheaded concerted efforts to utilize cultural resources on behalf of powerful political patrons.  
In the process, cultural positioning was superseded by cultural patronage, as local and central 
officials leveraged party and state resources to capitalize on cultural claims for purposes 
somewhat different from those that had animated popular mobilization in earlier decades.  In the 
                                                           
24 Mao Zedong, “The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War” (October 1938), in Selected 
Readings from the Works of Mao Tsetung (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1971): 155-56. 10 
 
revolutionary years, cultural positioning had enabled the communication of foreign concepts 
through familiar conduits in order to attract a mass following; after 1949, cultural patronage – 
conveyed through state-controlled media – was directed toward burnishing the image of the 
Communist Party and its top leaders by presenting them as national heroes.
25     
Mao Zedong drew the connection between the victory of his revolution and the revival of 
the Chinese nation in his famous remarks at the first session of the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference in September 1949, ten days before the official founding of the PRC, 
when he declared dramatically that the Chinese people had at last “stood up”:  
…our  work  will  go  down  in  the  history  of  mankind,  demonstrating  that  the 
Chinese people, comprising one quarter of humanity, have now stood up. The 
Chinese have always been a great, courageous and industrious nation; it is only in 
modern times that they have fallen behind . . . . For over a century our forefathers 
never  stopped  waging  unyielding  struggles  against  domestic  and  foreign 
oppressors, including the Revolution of 1911 led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, our great 
forerunner in the Chinese revolution. Our forefathers enjoined us to carry out their 
unfulfilled will. And we have acted accordingly . . . . From now on our nation 
will . . . . work courageously and industriously to foster its own civilization  . . . . 
Ours will no longer be a nation subject to insult and humiliation. We have stood 
up.
26 
As Mao recognized, the project of cultural nationalism would require serious and sustained work. 
A focus on patriotic mobilization, drawing upon historical and revolutionary resources, 
marked Mao’s China from the establishment of the PRC through the Cultural Revolution. With 
the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, Chinese citizens were encouraged to sign “patriotic 
pledges” [aiguo gongye] guaranteeing their commitment to the nationalist cause.  That period 
also saw the beginning of a series of impressive “Patriotic Health Campaigns” which framed 
mass public health and sanitation programs as “patriotic” actions to restore the Chinese nation to 
                                                           
25 Elizabeth J. Perry, Anyuan: Mining China’s Revolutionary Tradition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012). 
26 Mao Zedong, “The Chinese People Have Stood Up!” (September 21, 1949). 11 
 
good health in order to combat American imperialism.
27   In the Cultural Revolution, Chinese 
nationalism was reframed in opposition to Soviet revisionism.  Mao Zedong was now revered as 
a leader who had not only rescued the Chinese nation from the threat of Western imperialism and 
Japanese militarism; he was also touted as the global guru of revolutionary ideology.  Henceforth 
political correctness would be decided not in Moscow but in Beijing. 
In the early post-Mao era, when “reform and opening” encouraged criticisms of Mao 
Zedong and his radical policies, CCP leaders fiercely debated how to deal with the Maoist 
legacy.
28  Deng Xiaoping’s decision to stem the rising tide of de-Maoification by affirming 
commitment to “socialism with Chinese characteristics” was critical in facilitating a formidable 
blend of “traditional” and “revolutionary” sources of cultural authority to serve a nationalist end.  
Although the practice of cultural nationalism gained further attention and momentum after the 
suppression of the Tiananmen Uprising, it was already a pillar of CCP propaganda prior to June 
Fourth of 1989.   
Internal-circulation publications of the Central Propaganda Department make clear that 
the project of re-Orienting its message in order to make the Communist system appear more 
“Chinese” is not a new development.  In 1983-84, for example, the Propaganda Department 
issued a series of directives that called for strengthening both “patriotic education” in Chinese 
history and “education in the revolutionary tradition.”
29  On April 19, 1989, only a few days after 
the Tiananmen protests had begun and almost two months before the suppression of June Fourth, 
                                                           
27 Gary D. Rawnsley, “’The Great Movement to Resist America and Assist Korea’: how Beijing sold the Korean War,” 
Media, War, and Conflict, volume 2, number 3 (2009): 303ff. The anti-SARS campaign of 2003 was also presented 
as a “patriotic health campaign,” but absent the anti-Americanism of earlier days.  
28 Richard Baum, Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1994). 
29 “Yunyong geming wenwu jiaqiang chuantong jiaoyu” [Utilize revolutionary relics, strengthen traditional 
education], in Central Propaganda Department, ed., Xuanchuan dongtai, 1990 [Propaganda trends, 1990] (Beijing: 
People’s Daily Press, 1991): 73.  Internal circulation publication. 12 
 
the Propaganda Department communicated a new policy on the hanging of portraits in 
Tiananmen Square that revealed the central leadership’s commitment to the indigenization of 
their revolutionary tradition. Whereas past practice had called for the portraits of Marx, Engels, 
Lenin and Stalin to be hung alongside Mao’s portrait on the two major national holidays of May 
1 and October 1, the new policy mandated that henceforth no foreign Communist luminaries 
would be displayed on these occasions.  On May 1 (International Labor Day), Mao’s portrait 
would hang in solitary splendor atop the Gate of Heavenly Peace.  On October 1 (National Day), 
Mao would be joined by Sun Yat-sen.  The circular from the Propaganda Department explained 
that most countries display portraits of their national heroes on national holidays and that it was 
therefore entirely appropriate that Sun Yat-sen, as forefather of China’s modern revolution, 
should hang alongside Chairman Mao, who had led the Communist Party and the Chinese people 
in a revolution that overthrew the “three big mountains” (imperialism, feudalism and 
bureaucratic capitalism) and established the People’s Republic of China.
30  
The project of indigenizing the PRC’s claim to legitimacy was thus well underway prior 
to June Fourth, but the CCP’s official verdict on the Tiananmen Uprising reinforced the trend.  In 
the immediate aftermath of the crackdown, top party leaders charged that the student protest 
movement had been a product of the neglect of propaganda and “thought work” on the part of 
the now disgraced former General-Secretary of the CCP, Zhao Ziyang.  Thanks to Zhao’s lax 
attitude, it was alleged, proponents of wholesale Westernization had succeeded in debasing 
China’s traditional culture and revolutionary tradition, thereby allowing “Western bourgeois” 
                                                           
30 “Zhongyang xuanchuanbu guanyu jieri qijian Tiananmen guangchang xuangua weirenxiang de qingkuang 
tongzhi” [Central Propaganda Department notice concerning conditions for hanging portraits of famous figures at 
Tiananmen Square during holidays], April 19, 1989, in Central Propaganda Department, ed., Dang de xuanchuan 
gongzuo wenjian xuanbian, 1988-1992 [Selected documents on party propaganda work, 1988-1992] (Beijing: 
Chinese Communist Party Central Party School Press, 1994): 1867. Internal circulation publication. 13 
 
notions of democracy, freedom, and human rights to gain hold among the young.
31  To rid the 
nation of such pernicious ideas, the Propaganda Department (assisted by the iron fist of Public 
Security) spearheaded a massive censorship sweep in which 38 publishing houses were closed 
down, more than 700 periodicals were discontinued, and some 32 million books and magazines 
were confiscated.
32  
Censorship was seen as a necessary first step in the reassertion of party control over the 
ideological arena, but of greater significance in the long run would be a proactive effort to re-
Orient the terms of public discourse. Quoting Chairman Mao’s warning that “if the East wind 
does not prevail over the West wind, then the West wind will prevail over the East wind,” the 
new General-Secretary of the CCP, Jiang Zemin, called for an acceleration of ideological work 
intended to showcase China’s “dazzling material and spiritual civilization.”
33  In response, a 
central party directive of July 1989 enjoined propaganda departments and social science 
academies across the country to undertake systematic research into Chinese history, culture, 
society and economy to serve as the foundation for a propaganda program that would 
demonstrate the Chinese people’s “creativity, fighting capacity, and commitment to national 
unification.”
34   
The PRC’s concern for cultural governance has grown steadily in recent years.  Although 
the budget of the Propaganda Department is not publicly accessible, the official figures for 
                                                           
31 Jiang Zemin, July 20, 1989, “Zai quanguo xuanchuanbuzhang huiyishang de jianghua” [Talk at the national 
conference of propaganda department directors], in Central Propaganda Department, ed., Dang de xuanchuan 
gongzuo huiyi gaikuang he wenxian, 1951-1992 [Situation and documents of party propaganda work, 1951-1992] 
(Beijing: Communist Party Central Party School Press, 1994): 916-918.  Internal circulation publication.  “Yunyong 
geming wenwu”: 72-74. 
32 Wang Renzhi, January 16, 1991, “Jianchi zhengque fangzhen, ba gongzuo zuoshen zuoxi zuoshi” [Stick to correct 
policy, carry out work deeply, meticulously and accurately], in Dang de xuanchuan gongzuo huiyi gaikuang he 
wenxian,1951-1992: 964. 
33 Jiang Zemin, July 20, 1989: 915.  
34 “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu jiaqiang xuanquan, sixiang gongzuo de tongzhi” [Party Central notice concerning 
strengthening of propaganda, thought work], July 28, 1989, in Dang de xuanchuan gongzuo huiyi gaikuang he 
wenxian, 1951-1992: 938-949. 14 
 
government spending on “cultural undertakings” (wenhua shiye) give a rough idea of the general 
trend.  In the years immediately following the Tiananmen Uprising, such spending increased by 
over 200 million yuan per year (from 1,357,000,000 RMB in 1989 to 1,946,000,000 RMB in 
1993).  With the launching of the Patriotic Education Campaign, spending on cultural initiatives 
took another major leap (from 2,237,000,000 RMB in 1993 to 3,425,000,000 in 1994).  It has 
continued to climb ever since.  In 2010, the official figure stood at 52,952,000,000 RMB – a fifty 
fold increase in twenty years.
35   
Internal bulletins from the Propaganda Department stressed that the CCP was to be 
depicted as the chief custodian of Chinese civilization, credited with perpetuating an allegedly 
uninterrupted party tradition of protecting ancient cultural relics as national treasures.  It was 
asserted that even under the duress of war, the party had ordered the military to go to great 
lengths to safeguard China’s cultural heritage.  In order to preserve priceless artifacts such as 
those contained in the Forbidden City, for example, the CCP had supposedly taken every 
possible measure to ensure the peaceful liberation of the city of Beijing.  In the forty years 
thereafter, the importance of cultural preservation had been reflected in the establishment of a 
special agency and the promulgation of a steady stream of central laws, policies, and directives 
for this purpose.
36  The Propaganda Department emphasized that schools, family and society all 
bore responsibility for instructing the younger generation in the protection and promotion of 
cultural relics, which was seen as beneficial for cultivating allegiance to one’s local native place 
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as well as fostering patriotism.
37 National holidays, anniversaries of important historical events 
(including those causing national humiliation), and major athletic competitions were singled out 
as excellent opportunities for disseminating propaganda capable of stirring strongly patriotic 
feelings.  The collective participation and mass enthusiasm exhibited on such occasions, it was 
suggested, would permit a deep and abiding educational impact.
38  These bulletins made no 
mention of the destructive episodes in CCP history when party leaders had actively encouraged 
vicious attacks on elements of Chinese tradition: the Red Terror of the 1920s, the Destroy the 
Four Olds of the 1960s, and the Criticize Lin Biao Criticize Confucius Campaign of the 1970s, 
for example.
39  Rather, the re-Orientation of the Propaganda Department called for the 
recognition, protection and preservation of revolutionary and pre-revolutionary relics alike, as 
though they were all an integral part of a unitary and uninterrupted glorious “Chinese 
tradition.”
40  
As part of the post-Tiananmen Patriotic Education Campaign, propaganda departments at 
all levels of the system were encouraged to identify familiar local sites to serve as “educational 
bases” where instruction in the history of China and the indispensable role of the Communist 
Party in unifying and modernizing the nation could be effectively conducted.
41  Such education, 
it was stressed, should encourage young people to nurture fervent feelings for the motherland 
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capable of generating national pride and self-confidence.
42  “Patriotism,” the Propaganda 
Department explained, “is the powerful emotion . . . . of deeply loving the motherland . . . . The 
children of China, having been raised in the bosom of the motherland, should harbor profound 
sentiments toward the motherland akin to what they feel toward their own mother.”
43 The key to 
instilling these feelings was said to be a proper appreciation of China’s unique “national 
character” [guoqing].
44  
Reeducating Chinese youth so as to prevent another student uprising was a top priority in 
the aftermath of June Fourth, but party leaders also recognized a pressing need to counteract the 
hostility of the international community.  At a July 1989 meeting of provincial propaganda 
directors from around the country, Premier Li Peng blamed reporting by American and Hong 
Kong journalists for having fanned the flames of insurgency prior to the imposition of martial 
law.  Li went on to reveal that he had recently floated with Chinese diplomats posted overseas 
his suggestion that the Central Propaganda Department should produce a video sympathetic to 
the June Fourth crackdown and pay for it to be broadcast on television networks around the 
world.  Having been rebuffed on grounds that his scheme would be unacceptable to the foreign 
media, Li Peng remarked sarcastically that although the Western media claimed to have a free 
press, it was obviously highly restricted and rigid!  Li bemoaned China’s having lost a major 
opportunity in failing to seize the propaganda initiative while the Tiananmen protests were still 
underway, and he concluded that the PRC must redouble its international propaganda efforts in 
future.
45 
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The dismantling of the Soviet Union in 1991 further convinced the central Chinese 
leadership of the need for an international propaganda initiative that would distinguish its own 
“national character” from that of its erstwhile Communist “Big Brother.”  The Propaganda 
Department called for drawing a sharp contrast between China’s political stability and the 
existential crisis unfolding in the former USSR.
46 Post mortems on the Soviet collapse 
highlighted the issue of cultural governance, noting the significance of ethnic and cultural 
identity in sustaining or subverting a Communist system.
47  As one analyst put it, “The survival 
of the Soviet Union as a sovereign state was due to the eleven minorities who allied in support of 
the socialist system and Marxist ideology.  It was precisely this cultural identity that constituted 
the national interest of the Soviet Union.  As soon as this cultural identity was no longer 
recognized, the national unity of the USSR disintegrated.  From this we can see that cultural 
identity [wenhua rentong] is the precondition for national interest.”
48 
   Overseas Chinese, especially those residing in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau, were a 
major focus of international propaganda efforts aimed at solidifying national identity and interest.  
The selection of sites for patriotic education that would appeal to this critical constituency was 
particularly encouraged.  For example, in 1994-95 Shaoxing’s Propaganda Department was 
praised for having identified and publicized (with the assistance of academic expertise) more 
than twenty sites in the city that could be associated with Yu the Great, a legendary ruler who is 
respected along with Yao and Shun as one of the three great sages of ancient China and to whom 
prayers were traditionally offered for purposes of flood prevention.  Noting that overseas 
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Chinese continued to pay homage to Yu, the Zhejiang government approved a recommendation 
by the Shaoxing Propaganda Department to promote the public worship of Yu the Great by 
refurbishing his tomb (which required demolishing nearly fifty homes) so that tourists and 
pilgrims could congregate there for collective observances. In connection with the city’s 
initiative, which it dubbed the “Number One Construction Project for Worshiping Yu,” 
donations were sought from both domestic and overseas organizations and individuals.  The 
Shaoxing native-place association of Hong Kong explained its sizeable donation to the project by 
noting that public worship of Yu “promotes our Chinese national spirit, perpetuates our excellent 
historical and cultural traditions . . . and strengthens national cohesion.”  To publicize the 
initiative, the Shaoxing Propaganda Department convened several international academic 
conferences and sponsored the publication of a series of scholarly monographs on the subject of 
Yu the Great. It also fed favorable reports about the project to domestic and international 
newspapers, magazines, radio and television. At a ceremony to mark the first public 
commemoration of Yu at his refurbished tomb on April 20, 1995, more than a thousand 
representatives of the PRC’s people’s political consultative conference, central ministries, and 
provincial and city governments were reportedly joined by delegates from Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
Macau and even a number of Western countries.
49 
  As the Shaoxing case suggests, propaganda departments often enlist professional 
academic talent in the effort to uncover and exploit appropriate cultural resources.
  This is not a 
new practice; establishment intellectuals have long played a critical role in promoting the party-
state’s agenda.
50  Grants from the Ministry of Education and other government agencies are 
frequently tied to projects that reflect propaganda priorities.  Academies of social sciences at all 
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levels and departments of social sciences and humanities in the major universities depend 
heavily upon such funding and routinely reshape research programs to align with the party’s 
changing priorities as announced by the Central Propaganda Department.
51   Today, for example, 
researchers across the country are busy trying to put some flesh on the barebones of Xi Jinping’s 
call for a “Chinese Dream.”
52  But this work is not left entirely to academics.  Propaganda cadres 
themselves are also supposed to devote serious attention to investigation and study.  According 
to an internal directive of the Central Propaganda Department, propaganda cadres at all levels are 
expected as a rule of thumb to spend 90% of their workday engaged in research and only 10% in 
formulating propaganda materials and policy recommendations.
53  The Propaganda Department 
by no means sees its primary mission as an academic one, however.  It is much more concerned 
about the emotional and political than the cerebral or scholarly impact of its efforts. 
Emotion Work 
The importance of gauging and guiding public emotions, both domestic and international, 
is emphasized repeatedly in Propaganda Department teaching materials.  The overriding goal is 
to make people feel sympathetic to the party’s agenda.  Central to this goal is a concern for 
“public sentiment” [yuqing] – an umbrella concept that refers to the cumulative emotional and 
cognitive impact on ordinary people (Chinese and foreigners alike) of party and government 
policies.  It is the responsibility of propaganda cadres to assess and interpret public sentiment so 
that policies can be fine-tuned in response.
54  Under the principle that “internal and external are 
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different” [neiwai youbie], the Department recommends discrimination in choosing appropriate 
symbols to appeal to different audiences.    When the target audience for party propaganda is 
international rather than domestic, Chairman Mao and the revolutionary origins of the PRC 
usually go unmentioned in favor of concentrating on the splendors of the “Chinese cultural 
tradition.”   Within this “tradition,” moreover, international propaganda may be further 
differentiated according to the particular country toward which it is directed.  A recent handbook 
on propaganda work notes that propaganda aimed at the United States should emphasize the 
contributions of individual heroes in Chinese history because Americans admire individuals; 
propaganda targeting Japan should emphasize China’s beautiful natural scenery and colorful folk 
customs because these appeal to Japanese sensibilities; propaganda directed at Europe should 
highlight China’s love for the environment and its inherent pacifism in order to satisfy the Green 
and anti-war sympathies of Europeans, and so on.
55  
Central Propaganda Department directives often begin with a familiar quote from 
Chairman Mao: “Without investigation, no one has a right to speak.”  The main purpose of 
investigation, today as in the past, is to understand the attitudes and outlook of the intended 
audience so as to formulate effective tactics and strategies to advance Communist Party priorities. 
The Propaganda Department still points to Mao Zedong’s 1927 Report on an Investigation of the 
Peasant Movement in Hunan, which extolled revolutionary violence in the Chinese countryside, 
as setting the standard for gauging public emotions in accordance with “mass line” principles.  
Cadres are urged to approach their work as an art form as well as a science; propaganda should 
appeal as strongly to people’s feelings as to their reason.  At the same time, propaganda work 
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must be continuously upgraded and updated to suit the ever-evolving inclinations and sentiments 
of a variety of contemporary audiences.
56 
As the reference to Mao’s Hunan Report indicates, serious attention to mass emotions is 
nothing new for the Chinese Communist Party.  Since its revolutionary days, the CCP 
systematized “emotion work” as part of a conscious strategy of psychological engineering.  
Through such techniques as “speaking bitterness,” “denunciation,” “criticism-self criticism,” 
“rectification” and “thought reform,” the Chinese Communists heightened emotional 
commitment among cadres as well as ordinary recruits to their cause.  In the 1930s and 1940s, 
dedication born of this “emotion-raising” [tigao qingxu] was a key ingredient in Communist 
campaigns against Japanese soldiers and Chinese landlords alike.  After 1949, patterns of 
emotion work developed during the wartime years lived on in a series of highly-charged mass 
campaigns that stretched from Land Reform and the Suppression of Counter-Revolutionaries 
through the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution.
57   
Mao Zedong himself was keenly attuned to the importance of emotions in mass 
mobilization, and devoted significant attention in his writings to a discussion of the role of 
human feelings in revolutionary transformation.
58  But Mao was not alone among the Chinese 
Communist revolutionaries in this recognition.  As early as the Anyuan workers’ club of 1922-25, 
CCP propaganda cadres made a conscious and concerted effort to enlist mass emotions to serve 
the revolutionary cause.  Cultural activities such as drama and cinema were seen as effective 
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mobilizing vehicles precisely because of their ability to tug at people’s heartstrings.
59  The 
process of cultural governance with an eye toward its emotional effect was further systematized 
after the establishment of the Jiangxi Soviet in the early 1930s.  A CCP propagandist recalled of 
the make-shift theatrical performances staged in Ruijin to generate support for the Red Army: 
When the audience watched the comic scenes they laughed loudly; 
when they watched tragic scenes they lowered their heads and wept  or 
angrily denounced the landlords.  Thus we knew that the drama had deeply 
stirred the audience, achieving propaganda results.  How happy we were 
then!
60 
American journalist Edgar Snow, who interviewed Communist leaders after their epic Long 
March, highlighted the emotional and ideological role of theater in the Communists’ 
mobilization drive: “There was no more powerful weapon of propaganda in the Communist 
movement than the Reds’ dramatic troupes, and none more subtly manipulated . . .  When the 
Reds occupied new areas, it was the Red Theater that calmed the fears of the people, gave them 
rudimentary ideas of the Red program, and dispensed great quantities of revolutionary thoughts, 
to win the people’s confidence.”
 61  Once moved by such theatrical performances, peasant 
recruits were encouraged to articulate their own accusations against their former oppressors.  As 
a propaganda worker in the Northeast noted, “We felt that speaking bitterness was extremely 
effective in stimulating class hatreds and heightening feelings of vengeance . . .  The purpose of 
war became clear, and the emotions of the troops were raised.”
62 
Modernization and Improvisation 
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The tradition of revolutionary “emotion work,” modernized to take advantage of 
advances in communications technology, lives on in post-Mao China.  A telling example was the 
suppression campaign that party leaders launched against Falun Gong in the summer of 1999.  
Television and radio broadcasts flooded the air waves with testimonials by bereaved relatives of 
Falun Gong victims who railed against the “evil cult” that had led their loved ones astray.  
Sobbing denunciations of Master Li Hongzhi blamed Falun Gong’s supreme leader for the 
tragedies of insanity, suicide, starvation and even murder that had befallen parents, children, or 
spouse.  Although national television and radio had supplanted the community theater as the 
favored venue for carefully orchestrated emotional performances, the Propaganda Department’s 
methods bore more than a passing resemblance to previous mass campaign tactics.
63 
Less than a decade after the anti-Falun Gong campaign, the Propaganda Department 
embarked on another technological upgrade, this time graduating from radio and television to 
internet and cell phone as more effective means of reaching a population that relies increasingly 
on these new modes of communication.  Impressive as such modernization efforts are, they 
constitute but the latest chapter in a long history of cultural governance designed to resonate 
emotionally with its target audience so as to win popular acceptance for the party’s political 
agenda.   
To note such continuities in governance practices is certainly not to suggest that nothing 
has changed in recent years. In sharp contrast to Mao’s day, when propaganda was intended to 
move the masses to revolutionary action, today the point is to detect and dampen any sparks of 
protest in order to stabilize party rule.  Yet the importance of engineering popular emotions in 
service to party concerns remains a central focus.  In a recent teaching manual compiled by the 
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Central Propaganda Department, for example, Hebei Province is commended for having 
established an effective “public sentiment office” [yuqingban] in response to the infamous 
tainted milk scandal that beset that province in 2008.  With an estimated 300,000 victims of 
adulterated milk, including six infants who died of kidney failure, the incident triggered 
impassioned protests by distraught parents seeking redress on behalf of their afflicted children.  
The public sentiment office, led by ten cadres from the Hebei Propaganda Department, initially 
focused on internet communications as a guide to popular feelings.  It harvested and analyzed 
tens of thousands of web postings by Hebei netizens, on the basis of which the office issued 
instructions to internet control agencies [wangguan bumen] on how best to manage digital 
portals, chat rooms and bulletin boards so as to defuse public outrage.  The sentiment office also 
proactively manufactured internet discussions in order to seize control of the public discourse.  
Once the office had dealt with the internet threat, it undertook a more familiar form of 
investigation and mobilization.  A ten-person survey research team, assisted by 70 investigators, 
visited every town and neighborhood in Shijiazhuang (where the milk powder scandal had 
originated) over a one-month period in order to ascertain and assess the feelings of various social 
groups in the affected area.  The public sentiment office provided daily updates on its survey 
findings in a special bulletin for provincial cadres entitled Daily Trends in Public Sentiment, and 
compiled executive summaries with proposals for new government policies – e.g., low-interest 
loans to dairy farmers for the purchase of high-quality fertilizer – based on the findings.  This 
coordinated effort by the provincial propaganda department to comprehend, channel and control 
public sentiment was credited with forestalling mass protest in response to the deadly breach of 
food safety.
64    
                                                           
64 National Academy for Propaganda Cadres, ed., Xuanchuan sixiang wenhua gongzuo: anli xuanbian [Propaganda, 
thought and cultural work: selected cases] (Beijing: Study Press, 2011): 279-289. 25 
 
The Chinese Communists do not simply replicate the techniques of Confucian 
culturalism, nor do they merely apply a thin veneer of modern nationalism to an otherwise 
traditional formula.  Rather, cultural governance under the PRC bespeaks an inventiveness born 
of decades of revolutionary experimentation.  In a co-edited volume with Sebastian Heilmann, 
Mao’s Invisible Hand: The Political Foundations of Adaptive Governance in Contemporary 
China, we propose that the revolutionary past of the CCP continues to exert a significant 
influence on contemporary politics and policies.  The achievements of the post-Mao economic 
reforms, we suggest, are due not only to Adam Smith’s invisible hand of market forces, but also 
to Mao’s invisible hand of “guerrilla policy-making”: a pragmatic, trial and error method of 
handling crisis and uncertainty that originated in the Communist base areas during the war with 
Japan.  Thanks to its unusual revolutionary origins, the Chinese Communist political system 
allows for more diverse and flexible input and response than would be predicted from its formal 
political structures, which remain for the most part standard Leninist institutions.
65   
The CCP operates according to classic Soviet principles of so-called “democratic 
centralism,” and exercises control over the bureaucracy through standard Soviet Nomenklatura 
procedures (with the Organization Department assigning party and government officials to their 
posts).  Anyone familiar with the political institutions of the former USSR or the Communist 
countries of Eastern Europe would have little difficulty grasping an organization chart of the 
PRC.
66  But despite this institutional similarity, the operations of the Chinese system are 
nonetheless distinctive in ways that reflect China’s unusual revolutionary history and that have 
bequeathed a surprisingly adaptive and responsive approach to policy.  In reaction to massive tax 
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riots that erupted across the Chinese countryside in the 1990s, for instance, the government in 
2005 took the extraordinary step of abolishing the agricultural tax.  In response to widespread 
internet complaints about abusive treatment of migrant workers at the hands of the police, China 
substantially revised its vagrancy laws to make it more difficult for public security to arrest and 
impound rural migrants in the cities. Such instances by no means imply that the Chinese political 
system is democratic, but they do suggest that there is more policy responsiveness and flexibility 
than one would expect on the basis of China’s Communist institutions per se.
67 
China’s propaganda czar Liu Yunshan, one of the new standing committee members of 
the Politburo elected at the 18
th Party Congress, gave an instructive account of this adaptive 
policy style in an important speech entitled “Being Good at Summing up Experience is Our 
Party’s Excellent Tradition.”  Liu opened his speech with a quote from Chairman Mao: “We 
depend for a living on summing up experience.”  He proceeded to explain that “propaganda, 
thought and cultural work” today, as in the revolutionary past, must operate as a pragmatic 
response to crisis and uncertainty.  Mao’s emphasis on learning from experience was invoked as 
the inspiration for today’s “hard fought battle after battle.” Liu cited the 2008 Sichuan 
earthquake, the unrest in Tibet and Xinjiang, and the international financial crisis as examples of 
recent battles during the course of which the Propaganda Department learned to adapt to new 
challenges with the aid of new tools – cellular technology, the internet, and new social media in 
particular.
68 
Liu Yunshan’s speech was reprinted as the preface to a series of case studies which were 
published as teaching materials for trainees at the National Academy for Propaganda Cadres in 
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Beijing.  The case studies, based on recent incidents, were chosen to illustrate “breakthroughs” 
[tupo] that occurred in propaganda work – some due to planned experiments and others to 
improvisations “in the midst of battle” –in conjunction with the incidents.  According to Liu, the 
period in the run-up to the Beijing Olympics saw a major shift in propaganda work, from a 
reactive toward a more proactive approach, as cadres turned to the aggressive use of cutting-edge 
communications technology to gain the upper hand in dealing with potentially unsettling issues.  
In Guangdong, for example, in 2009 the provincial propaganda department partnered with the 
local branch of China Mobile, the largest cell phone and internet provider in the province, to 
develop an attractive and interactive webpage complete with video games and animated cartoons 
intended to convey in easily digestible form the official line on a range of sensitive international 
and domestic questions. Within a few months, the website was being visited regularly by more 
than half a million netizens.
69 Another case singled out for praise and emulation by the 
Propaganda Department was that of the Jincheng Coal Group in Shanxi Province.  An old state-
owned enterprise burdened by a large number of disgruntled employees when it embarked on 
privatization, Jincheng’s propaganda department contracted with IT specialists at Shanghai’s 
Jiaotong University to construct a multi-tiered digital network aimed at accessing and assessing 
the mentality [sixiang dongtai] of all 60,000 members of its workforce.  Workers were 
encouraged to share their concerns and complaints through emails and blogs.  As the Jincheng 
party secretary instructed his propaganda cadres, “In this network, information about employees’ 
thoughts are ‘letters’ that circulate freely in the network.  You are the postmen responsible for 
handling the mail.”  The more than 10,000 messages received from Jincheng workers provided a 
treasure trove of information that the enterprise leadership credited with permitting a smooth 
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privatization process, free from the vociferous demonstrations and sit-ins that plagued the 
privatization of many other state-owned enterprises.
70 
In the above cases potential protests were apparently averted thanks to the preemptive use 
of high-tech communications, but in other instances propaganda methods were honed in the 
actual process of managing collective protests.  On June 1, 2007, thousands of residents of the 
city of Xiamen in Fujian Province took to the streets for what they euphemistically called a 
“stroll,” intended to register opposition to the construction of a PX chemical factory in the area.  
To gauge the level of dissatisfaction, Xiamen authorities conducted an online poll that revealed 
widespread and deep discontent.  As a result, provincial officials agreed to relocate the plant to a 
desolate piece of land on Gulei Peninsula in Zhangzhou municipality, a safe distance from 
Xiamen.  When journalists and bloggers encouraged Zhangzhou residents to emulate the Xiamen 
“strollers,” the municipal propaganda department engaged experts from the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences and Xiamen University to attest to the appropriateness of the new site in internet 
postings and other media.  The propaganda department also came up with a catchy and widely 
publicized slogan intended to foster collective pride in Zhangzhou’s acceptance of the chemical 
plant: “Maritime development begins with Zhangzhou; Loving Zhangzhou begins with us!”  The 
Zhangzhou propaganda cadres realized the need to dispense with their usual practice of 
responding to protest by censoring the media, in favor of a new approach that actively enlisted 
the participation of the media (state and private alike) in a propaganda blitz intended to “guide 
public sentiment” along lines congruent with state policy.  Hundreds of radio and television 
broadcasts publicized the remarks of leading officials and academic authorities in support of the 
factory relocation; newspapers and other periodicals were instructed to print favorable stories; 
prime-time news reports were preempted to announce new developments and work plans for the 
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PX project; countless cellular and computer messages transmitted a stern public security warning 
against illegal mass disturbances. The city of Zhangzhou employed a group of over 120 
distinguished “experts” drawn from propaganda, media, and academia to serve as internet 
monitors and commentators [wangluo yuepingyuan] to respond to netizen complaints with blogs 
and microblogs that defended the government’s position.  More than five hundred college 
student volunteers were dispatched to surrounding villages to educate rural dwellers in the 
official line through “heart-to-heart” chats with individual families.  On the basis of these 
household visits, influential villagers were selected to participate in state-sponsored visits to 
Nanjing and other cities where PX factories were already operating without incident so that they 
could spread the good word to skeptical neighbors.  In short, a range of mobilizing techniques – 
some drawn from decades-old mass campaigns and others from recent technological advances – 
was deployed in service to the cause.
71   
As the Zhangzhou case indicates, cultural governance is not simply a matter of the state 
imposing its will on an otherwise inert and uninvolved society.  Members of Fujian society – 
journalists, professors, students, and villagers – took an active part in constructing and 
communicating a message that apparently in the end made sense to local constituencies.  As is 
true in many domains of grassroots Chinese governance, both in Mao’s day and today, society 
plays a critical role in interpreting, iterating, and enforcing state policy. 
Another incident that the Propaganda Department credited with generating new 
approaches to collective protest was the notorious Weng’an riot, which erupted in Guizhou 
Province in June of 2008 after a middle-school girl drowned under suspicious circumstances that 
her family believed involved police culpability.  Crowds broke through public security cordons 
and set fire to government buildings and police vehicles.  Although the rampage was triggered by 
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the girl’s death, it reflected widespread anger toward the Weng’an authorities, who for some 
years had employed heavy-handed tactics to forcibly relocate residents to make way for lucrative 
local government development projects.  News of the riot went viral on Chinese social media, 
and by the time the Guizhou provincial authorities intervened the situation was already dire.  The 
Guizhou Propaganda Department reported the circumstances to the News Office [xinwen ban] of 
the State Council, which gave its permission to censor both public and commercial press and 
internet to eliminate stories deemed harmful to the restoration of order.  But provincial 
authorities soon realized that, with the information having already been so widely disseminated, 
censorship alone would prove inadequate.  Rather than simply silence the discussion, therefore, 
they decided actively to “shape public sentiment” by commissioning and publishing information 
intended to mobilize citizen support for the provincial response to the crisis (which included 
three contrite public apologies by the provincial governor to the people of Weng’an for the poor 
performance of their local county authorities).  For a time, one-third of the Guizhou Daily, the 
official newspaper for the province, was dedicated to government-sponsored reporting on the 
Weng’an incident.  The provincial propaganda department also recruited dozens of “internet 
critics” to compose and post hundreds of lively essays intended to change the tone of electronic 
discussions.  Once it had carefully prepared the ground, the provincial propaganda department 
proceeded to invite reporters from all the major national print and digital media outlets to visit 
Weng’an to conduct pre-arranged interviews with the victim’s parents, relatives, eye-witnesses, 
and local residents.  Within the space of two weeks, nearly 150 reporters from more than 30 
media outlets had travelled to Weng’an at the invitation of the provincial propaganda department. 
Most were reportedly satisfied with the provincial account, which pinned the blame for the 
incident entirely on the county government. The practice of deflecting criticism from higher to 31 
 
lower levels of government is of course another familiar Chinese governance pattern.  In this 
case, according to the analysis of the Central Propaganda Department, the concerted public 
relations effort on the part of the Guizhou Propaganda Department was so successful that it even 
elicited praise from America’s Time Magazine for the unusually transparent coverage of 
events!
72 
To recap, the Chinese propaganda system does not function as a Leninist echo chamber 
in which central policies simply reverberate down the ranks. Rather, there is considerable 
latitude for experimentation and innovation on the part of local government officials, whose 
initiatives may subsequently receive central endorsement.  
Symbolic Resources 
Propaganda departments at all levels make liberal use of both revolutionary and pre-
revolutionary symbols to construct and project a persuasive message. The particular issues and 
instruments vary from once incident to another, but underpinning these diverse efforts is a 
consistent aim to foster a powerful collective identity that will contribute to the legitimacy and 
stability of the Communist party-state.  Prior to the precipitous demise of Chongqing Party 
Secretary Bo Xilai, the Central Propaganda Department gave high marks to his “singing Red” 
campaign to revive the Maoist revolutionary spirit, citing surveys which indicated that 97.25% of 
the city’s residents had participated in the campaign with 96.51% of the participants reporting a 
high degree of satisfaction with the initiative.  As one netizen responded to an online survey 
conducted by the Propaganda Department during the campaign, “In today’s Chongqing, if you 
can’t sing a few red songs . . .  then you’re OUT! [the word ‘OUT’ was written in English]”  
Improbably, the Propaganda Department credited the campaign with having restored popular 
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faith in Marxism among the younger generation of Chongqing, noting that by the end of 2010 
nearly 80% of those surveyed responded that they believed in Marxism, an increase of more than 
10% over the previous year.
73  An examination of the lyrics of the 36 approved “red songs” 
featured in the campaign reveals, however, that the songs make little if any mention of Marxism.  
Instead, the dominant themes are patriotism, national unification, and the splendors of Chinese 
tradition.  The top song on the list, entitled Toward Revival [zouxiang fuxing], includes the lyrics 
“We are the heroic sons and daughters of China, whose ancient civilization sparkles anew.  To 
revive the Chinese nation is our ideal. . . . China towers majestically in the Orient; march onward, 
onward toward revival.”
74 
  A continuing commitment to honoring the legacy of Mao Zedong’s revolution as an 
integral part of “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” has not diminished the party-state’s 
interest in claiming much older foundations of legitimacy.  In response to a “national learning 
craze” [guoxue re] focused on the Confucian classics, which swept the country in the 1990s, the 
symbol of Confucius was deemed especially useful as a vehicle for cultural governance, both 
externally and internally.
75  In 2004, a government-sponsored program for a global network of 
Confucius institutes was launched in Beijing.  Eight years later, more than 350 Confucius 
institutes and 500 Confucius classrooms had been established in more than 100 countries around 
the world.
76    
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  Evidently encouraged by this trend, the Propaganda Department took the unusual step in 
January 2011 of installing without prior announcement a large bronze statue of Confucius in the 
center of Tiananmen Square, directly in front of the National Museum (formerly the Museum of 
Revolutionary History) and just to the side of Mao’s mausoleum.  The move generated an 
outpouring of online criticism from Chinese netizens, however, who drew attention to the 
unseemliness of situating the ancient sage amidst all the monuments to the revolution, and the 
statue was then removed (unannounced and overnight) three months later, just as suddenly and 
surreptitiously as it had been installed.  Whether the removal was a response to the public outcry, 
or whether it pointed to a resurgence of neo-Maoist sympathies among the political elite (at a 
time when Bo Xilai’s Singing Red campaign was still in full swing), was unclear.  But that the 
reversal was evidence of a botched attempt at cultural patronage was obvious to all. 
  Efforts at cultural governance – even by as seasoned a practitioner as the Central 
Propaganda Department – may be ill-considered and unsuccessful.  Another example of a failed 
initiative was the effort to resuscitate that quintessential exemplar of the Maoist spirit, Lei Feng, 
through a series of melodramatic movies released in the spring of 2013.  The films proved to be a 
box office disaster, much to the chagrin of responsible officials in the Central Propaganda 
Department and Ministry of Culture.
77  Party propaganda does not always strike a chord with its 
intended audience.  Even worse, from the Party’s perspective, officially approved symbols and 
slogans can be hijacked for alternative purposes.  The state’s own rhetoric may backfire when, 
for example, cynics assign unauthorized meanings to the Three Represents or laid-off workers 
march behind portraits of Chairman Mao.  Cultural governance, in other words, is a variable – 
the effects of which will fluctuate depending not only upon the symbols themselves, but also 
upon the venue, format, timing, audience, and so forth.  Indeed, it is precisely the Propaganda 
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Department’s recognition that not all of its projects resonate with the public which explains its 
close attention to such matters as attitudinal investigation, technological innovation, and 
emotional impact. 
Conclusion 
  The current effort to commingle revolutionary and pre-revolutionary symbolic resources 
as though there were no inherent contradiction between Confucian “culturalism” and modern 
“nationalism” is but the latest twist in a complicated and circuitous process aimed at justifying 
the Communist Party’s right to rule.  From the earliest days of the CCP right down to the present, 
cultural governance with a strongly nationalistic flavor has been regarded as critical to the 
party’s mission. The imaginative application of cultural appeals to augment the Communist 
Party’s moral and political authority by presenting itself as the savior of the nation has played a 
crucial – albeit ever changing – role from the very inception of the Party. Xi Jinping’s recent 
allusions to a “Chinese Dream” of a strong party and nation, fits comfortably within this familiar 
frame of reference.   
These days the CCP makes no apology for the denunciation and devastation that it 
unleashed on remnants of China’s so-called “feudal” culture at various junctures in its 
tumultuous history.  In fact it makes no mention of these sorry episodes.  At the sixth plenum of 
the seventeenth party congress in October 2011, a central party decision on deepening cultural 
reform unabashedly asserted that “the 5,000 years of our national cultural development has been 
a major spiritual force for the Chinese nation and a major contributor to the civilization of all 
humanity. From the day of its founding, the Chinese Communist Party has been the faithful heir 
and advocate of this outstanding traditional Chinese culture.”
78  A recent directive which 
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prohibits teaching about the party’s historical mistakes (along with six other “speak-nots”) 
suggests that the CCP’s record of cultural destruction is unlikely to emerge as a topic of public 
debate in the near future.
79 
The Propaganda Department does not hold an unblemished record of success in pursuing 
its project of cultural nationalism, to be sure, but its cumulative achievement – especially when 
considered in light of the collapse of most other Communist systems – is quite remarkable 
nonetheless.  The comparative resilience of the Chinese Communist party-state must be 
attributed to many factors, of course, but among the most important are the kindred feelings that 
many Chinese evidently harbor toward their political system.  The Chinese Communist regime 
by most accounts enjoys a surprising degree of legitimacy in the eyes of its own citizens.
80 As 
Andrew Nathan summarizes the findings of empirical research on post-Tiananmen Chinese 
political attitudes, “There is much evidence from both quantitative and qualitative studies to 
suggest that  . . . .  the regime as a whole continues to enjoy high levels of acceptance.”
81  One 
reason for this popular support, it would seem, has been a successful re-Orientation of party 
propaganda to present the CCP as the acknowledged leader of a national revival that lays claim 
not only to the legacy of modern revolution but also to much older symbols of cultural splendor 
and power.
82    
The current brand of Chinese cultural nationalism is not without intrinsic limitations, of 
course.  The idea of reviving the “Chinese nation” is surely more appealing to those who self-
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identify as Han Chinese (wherever they may reside) than, for example, to Uighurs or Tibetans 
living within the territorial borders of the PRC.  Continuing unrest among the minority 
populations of Xinjiang and Tibet suggests that state-sponsored efforts to celebrate the “Chinese 
nation” are seen as unwelcome expressions of Han chauvinism by some citizens of the PRC who 
do not identify as Han.  This is obviously worrisome to a Chinese leadership mindful that the 
collapse of the Soviet Union was propelled in part by the defection of non-Russian minorities.  
Nevertheless, the PRC’s accomplishments in fostering a sense of shared cultural identity and 
national unity among the Han – whose “dialects” of Chinese are linguistically as diverse as the 
various Romance languages – is no small achievement. The fact that over 90 percent of the 
population of the PRC identifies as Han Chinese (and, thanks to state-supported migrations, that 
even Tibet and Xinjiang are now heavily populated by Han) renders this feat of considerable 
political significance. 
Even among the Han, however, cultural nationalism can be a double-edged sword.  On 
the one hand, nationalist sentiment encourages popular support for a strong Chinese state.  On 
the other hand, any perceived signs of weakness or incompetence on the part of Chinese 
government officials are liable to generate criticisms of the regime by those same nationalistic 
citizens.  The chance of a nationalist movement turning into an anti-government protest is 
therefore always a possibility.  Take, for example, the massive demonstrations triggered by the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands conflict in September 2012.  In addition to shouting anti-Japanese 
slogans, some protesters held up signs containing ironic statements that suggested oblique 
criticism of the PRC regime; e.g., “I’d rather feed corrupt officials than forfeit the Diaoyu 
Islands.”  The prevalence among the crowds of portraits of Chairman Mao – widely regarded as 37 
 
the symbol of a stronger, less corrupt China – was another indication that the ostensibly patriotic 
protest carried an implicit reproach of the current party leadership.
83 
The Communist Party over which Xi Jinping now presides faces a host of extremely 
serious problems and challenges. And many of these difficulties stem directly from the basically 
unreformed Leninist political institutions that persist in contemporary China.  Shortcomings 
inherent in these types of institutions, after all, have been proposed as a key explanation for the 
collapse of Communism across Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.
84   
The Chinese leadership is well aware of the vulnerabilities of its Leninist institutions.  
Behind closed doors, Xi Jinping warns his fellow Communist Party leaders that unless they 
manage to combat corruption, the PRC will suffer the same fate as the former Soviet Union.
85  
But publicly, Xi does not liken his regime to other Communist systems.  Rather, he portrays the 
PRC as an essentially Chinese system, fully in keeping with China’s own national character.  His 
attack on official corruption, associated in Chinese political culture with extravagant banqueting, 
calls for the exercise of culinary restraint with the folksy slogan: “Four Dishes and One Soup.”
86  
A public opinion poll conducted recently among residents in seven major Chinese cities 
suggests the degree to which China’s Communist system has been successfully indigenized.  
When asked to name their twelve favorite countries, respondents failed to include any other 
Communist or formerly Communist country.  China was the overwhelming favorite, followed at 
a considerable distance by the United States (with Japan ranked as number twelve).
87  When 
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queried as to whether the collapse of the Soviet Union had been on balance more helpful or 
harmful to China, only 12% considered the Soviet collapse harmful to China’s interests.
88  Asked 
whether China could resist Western pressure and continue to pursue a path of “socialism with 
Chinese characteristics,” 67.4 % answered in the affirmative.
89   Similarly, 65.8% thought it 
likely that the rise of China would result in the consolidation of a political system “different from 
a Western democratic model” and based on China’s “own national character.” 
90 A strong 
majority (69.1%) responded affirmatively to the question: “Influenced by domestic and 
international factors, contemporary young people have less knowledge of traditional Chinese 
culture.  Do you have confidence in the continuation and flourishing of traditional Chinese 
culture?”
91 
Skillful as the PRC’s leadership has been in re-Orienting its propaganda to both suit and 
shape public sentiment, it has not managed to eliminate political dissatisfaction among the 
populace. These days many Chinese citizens (Han and non-Han alike) readily voice severe 
criticisms of their political system – from rampant corruption to ruthless coercion.  But very 
seldom do they complain that the system is in any way un-Chinese.
92  Rather than attribute such 
problems to the shortcomings of an unreformed Soviet system, disgruntled citizens are apt to 
ascribe the faults of their political system to unjust tendencies rooted deep within the soil of 
Chinese culture – nepotism, bureaucratism, preference for rule by man over rule of law, feudal 
remnants. Those who feel aggrieved at the hands of unscrupulous officials rarely point the finger 
of blame at the Communist system itself.  Instead, like their ancestors in bygone centuries, 
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demonstrators kneel behind banners emblazoned with the age-old cry of protest in imperial 
China: “Wronged” [yuanwang]!
93  Decades of inventive and intensive cultural positioning and 
patronage on the part of the CCP, has paid off handsomely.  A political system alien in its 
institutional and ideological origins has been made to feel indigenous.  The foreign has been 
rendered familiar; a Russian recipe has been cooked so as to taste authentically Chinese. 
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